

*Robt. May*  
**BRITAIN'S  
MISTAKES**

IN THE

*1477 dd. 11*

**Commencement and Conduct**

*England. [Anti-] History, Politics.*  
*u* OF THE *- 1740.]*

**PRESENT WAR.**

BY A

Merchant and Citizen of LONDON.



*Not on.*  
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# BRITAIN'S

## MISTAKES, &c.

**A**S, by my Business and Conversation in the World, I have many Opportunities of making my self acquainted, not only with the Commerce of Foreign Nations, but also with the Strength and Situation of their Dominions, and the Relation they bear to each other, I hope it will not be look'd on as a Breach of Modesty in me to say, that, I think, I am more capable of knowing how they may be attack'd or injur'd, than a Country Gentleman, or an Officer of our Land Armies, who never was at much pains to inquire into the Situation or Circumstances of Foreign Countries.——Nay, if I should look upon my self as a better Judge than some Ministers, and some such we have had who have betrayed a most unpardonable Ignorance in this respect, there could be no Ground, I think, for accusing me of Vanity and Self-sufficiency.

And as from the *Call of the House* I suppose, that the *State of the Nation* will be brought under Consideration in *this Session of Parliament*, I think my self obliged in Conscience, and in Duty to my Country, to publish my Thoughts upon *that Subject*; because I think we have been guilty of most dangerous, if not fatal, *Mistakes or Neglects*, in the *Commencement and Prosecution* of the War we are now engaged in.

I have no Access to, I have no Correspondence with, *Ministers or Under-Ministers*, therefore I have no way of communicating my Thoughts to them; and besides, I know that some of my Brethren,

who have applied that way, imagine they met with *no great Attention*.——Some of the *Members of Parliament* I have the Honour to be acquainted with; but they are such as are so far from having an Influence upon the *Majority* of either House, that every thing they say is *industriously*, tho' I am convinced *falsely*, represented to proceed from Envy, Malice, or Disappointment, and that therefore no Regard ought to be had to it.——In these Circumstances, I have no Method but this, of communicating my Thoughts to those who ought to be made acquainted with them; and my doing it in this way will, I hope, be thought no Disrespect to his Majesty; for as the *Glory* of his *Reign* depends upon the *good Success* and *happy Issue* of the *present War*, the *Affection* and *Esteem* I have for my *Sovereign*, as well as the *Love* and *Regard* I have for my *Country*, render it, I think, incumbent upon me to shew, in the most publick and the most effectual Way I can, that, if one may judge of our *future* by our *past* Conduct, we are in *Danger* of being obliged to *conclude* this War by a *dishonourable* and *destructive* Peace, or to *carry it on* in the *most tedious* and the *most ruinous* Manner.

In order to make this *Danger* the more apparent, I shall shew what *Methods* we might, in my humble Opinion, have taken for putting a *speedy* and *honourable* End to the War; in the doing of which I shall give the *Reasons* for every *Step* I propose; and then I shall in the most respectful manner, that is possible, consider the *Methods* we have hitherto taken for *defending* ourselves or *annoying* the *Enemy*: After which I shall state and answer such *Objections* as may be made against the *Methods* which I think we ought to have taken in commencing and prosecuting the War; and conclude, with shewing the *dangerous State* we seem to be in at present.

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I know, this will be represented by *State Mercenaries*, as exposing the Weakness of my Country; but alas! our *Weakness*, I mean the *Weakness* of our *Conduct*, is too generally, too fatally known.

—— A Minister who knew nothing of the March of the *French* Troops into *Italy* in the Year 1733. till he had it from a *Brother Merchant* of mine in the City, who had an Account of it by a Letter from his Correspondent at *Geneva*, may perhaps imagine, that foreign Courts know as little of our Affairs as *he does of theirs*; but I can assure him, that no Court in *Europe*, especially that of *France* or *Spain*, derives its Knowledge of our Affairs from *weekly Journals* or *Pamphlets*, either of the one Side or the other.—— They have their Intelligence by Channels that may much more certainly be depended on; and, begging Pardon for the Expression, the Ministers they have at this Court *ought to be hanged* if they had not! for it is the Duty of every foreign Minister, to be a *diligent* and a *watchful* Spy upon the Court and Country where he resides.

This is the Duty of every Man that is sent as a Minister to any foreign Court; therefore he ought to spare no Cost that is necessary for procuring the best and most certain Intelligence, which is to be got chiefly from the *Underlings* and *Favourites* of *Power*, and not from those who, either by writing or talking, have declared themselves *no Friends* to the *Administration*.—— It is by *this* Channel that foreign Ministers usually get their Intelligence: —— It is by *this* Channel alone, they can get such Intelligence as may be *useful*; and if we have not proper Intelligence of *this sort* from every Country in *Europe*, I am sure, it is not owing to a *Want of secret Service Money*.

Having obviated this Objection I shall observe, that as our Plenipotentiaries were to meet at *Madrid* with the *Spanish* Plenipotentiaries, in Pursuance of the late Convention, about the 4th of *March* last,

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it must be supposed, that *our Ministers* had an Account of their first Conference before the *End of that Month*, and that they from thence at last found out, *that a War was inevitable*.—This, I suppose, was the true Reason of our not recalling Admiral *Haddock's Squadron*, and of our not sending Orders to suspend the Fortifications and new Plantations in *Carolina and Georgia*; which, the King of *Spain* says, we expressly promised; and therefore, in his *Manifesto*, he loudly complains of our Breach of Faith in both these Articles, and from thence, amongst other Things, takes Occasion to impute to us the *first Cause* of the War. But as his *Catholick Majesty* seems to be *no Enemy* to our *Ministers*, whatever he may be to the *Nation*, he takes Care to ascribe this Cause, *not* to our *Ministers*, *but* to the *Discontented Party* amongst us, that is to say, to the *whole Nation*, except a few of those who are the Favourites of the Administration.—And, indeed, I believe his *Catholick Majesty* is in the Right.—I do not know but he had some Reason to expect greater Condescension from *some of our Ministers*, than he could expect from the *Nation*.

However, if *our Ministers* saw, as I suppose they did, that the Spirit of *this Nation* would not allow them to make such Compliances as were necessary for satisfying the Pride of the *Spanish Nation*, I must from thence conclude, that before the End of *March* even *our Ministers* began to look upon a War with *Spain* as inevitable.—What in this Case were we to do?—It was not, 'tis true, proper for us to issue any *Letters of Reprisal*, or to commence *Hostilities*, till the 24th of *May*; because we could not till then judge certainly of the King of *Spain's* Intentions; and it was prudent in us to wait till the first real Breach of the Convention, *I mean the Articles ratified by his Majesty*, should be made by the Court of *Spain*.—But, surely, we ought to have begun  
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*that Moment to prepare, at least in a private manner, for War ; and how were we to prepare ?*

*Spain, we knew, was a Nation, that durst not look our Squadrons in the face at Sea.——A Squadron of 15 Line of Battle Ships before Cadiz, another of the like Number in the West Indies, and a third of the same Number upon our own Coasts, was, we knew, sufficient to lock up their Men of War in their Ports, and to prevent their attempting to make an Invasion upon any Part of our Dominions.—By having three such Squadrons at Sea we should have made it impossible for them to do us any Injury, except by their Privateers ; and for preventing this, a few Fourth or Fifth Rates to serve as Convoys to our own Ships, and to lye in the way for intercepting their Ships bound to or from the West Indies ; and a great Number of Sixth Rates and armed Sloops, to cruize upon their Coasts, in order to intercept their Privateers, and to give Notice to our Merchant Ships not to approach the Ports or Coasts of Spain, would have made it difficult for them to annoy our Trade, and very dangerous to carry on any Trade of their own.*

For this Purpose we should, in my humble Opinion, have had at least *Eight* 20 Gun Ships and armed Sloops, with *Three or Four* 4th or 5th Rates, stationed in the *Mediterranean*, and actually upon Duty there ; together with at least *Twelve* 20 Gun Ships and armed Sloops, and *Six* 4th or 5th Rates, stationed upon the Coasts of *Portugal* and *Galicia*, and in the *Bay of Biscay*, and actually upon Duty in their several Stations, before we had published *Reprisals*, or committed any Act of *Hostility* in *Europe*.

——As for the *West Indies*, we had no Occasion to send many 20 Gun Ships or armed Sloops to that Part of the World : If we had taken Care to have had a Squadron of 15 Line of Battle Ships there, with three or four 20 Gun Ships, besides the Guard Ships  
usual

*at the Time of Peace*, we might have trusted for the rest, to *our own People* in that Part of the World, for fitting out such a Number of *Privateers*, as would have been sufficient to protect *their own Trade*, and intercept *that of the Enemy*; especially, if we had taken Care to give *proper Encouragement* to the *armed Vessels* fitted out by private Adventurers, to attack *those of the Enemy*.——And as for our own Coasts, a Squadron of 15 Men of War, with our *usual Guard Ships and Custom-house Sloops*, would have been sufficient to have protected our Trade at Home, and to have secured us against any Invasion that could have been made by *so impotent an Enemy*.

For the Honour of the *British Flag* it would have been proper to have had a 90 Gun Ship, and an 80 Gun Ship in the Squadron kept at Home, and in that sent to the Coasts of *Spain*; and for the same Reason there ought to have been an 80 and a 70 Gun Ship in the Squadron sent to the *West-Indies*; but all the rest ought to have been 4th Rates of 60 or 50 Guns, or 5th Rates of 40 Guns; so that the Number of Seamen necessary may be easily computed as follows, *viz.*

In the three Squadrons proposed,

Ships.	Guns.	Men.	Totals of Men,
2	90	1170	
3	80	1560	
1	70	440	
16	60	5840	
20	50	5600	
3	40	600	
<hr/>			
45			14210

Cruisers

Totals of Men  
Brought over 14710

Cruisers in the *Mediterranean*.

Ships.	Guns.	Men.
2	50	560
2	40	400
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4		

960

Cruisers on the Coasts of *Portugal* and *Gallicia*, and in the Bay of *Biscay*.

3	50	840
3	40	600
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6		

1440

Small Ships and Sloops in the *Mediterranean*.

5	20	650
3 Sloops		225
<hr/>		
8		

875

Small Ships and Sloops on the Coasts of *Portugal*, &c.

8	20	1040
4 Sloops		265
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12		

1305

Small Ships and Sloops in the *West-Indies*.

4	20	
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360

Total of Seamen necessary 19150

This Number of Seamen and *Marines* would have been necessary for protecting *our own Trade*, and intercepting *that of the Enemy*, besides the Number necessary to be kept up in Times of the most profound Peace, which I cannot reckon at above 8000 ; because that Number has at least once of late Years

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been



been thought sufficient by Parliament; so that according to what I have proposed, the *whole Number* of Seamen necessary for carrying on the War against *Spain*, would have amounted to no more than 27150 Men.—Now, as we had the Year before a much larger Number than 8000 Seamen actually in Pay, if we had begun about the *End of March* last with raising 5 or 6000 *Marines*, I mean *Marines really designed for Sea Service*, and not marching Regiments under the Name of *Marines*, I believe it would have been very easy, between the *End of March* and the *End of June*, which was the soonest we could have had Use for the whole Number I have proposed, to have raised by *Degrees* the additional Number of Seamen we stood in need of, without preventing the *usual Supply* of Coals for the *City of London*, without any *Embargo* upon our Trade, without *much Pressing*, and without making any such *Fracas*, as might give a *real Alarm* to *Spain*.

As our Parliament was then sitting and our *present Ministers* could never complain of not being supported by Parliament in any vigorous Measures they *but seemed* resolved to pursue, 'twould have been easy to have obtained the Authority of Parliament, *without declaring the secret Intentions of our Administration*, both for raising the *Marines*, and for any new Regulations that might have been thought proper for encouraging Seamen to enter *voluntarily* into his Majesty's Service.—The *Convention* was, 'tis true, approved of, but it might have been said, that it was necessary to augment our Forces both by Sea and Land, *in order to enforce the Performance of that Convention*, and to perfect that *Preliminary* by a *definitive Treaty*, which was an Argument that had *often* before been made Use of *with Success*, tho' never so well founded as it was upon that Occasion.—Nay it was *afterwards*, upon the 11th of *May*, made Use of *with Success*; when both Houses of Parliament

ment granted his Majesty a *Vote of Credit*, without insisting upon his Reasons for demanding it.

Even the *Spaniards*, I believe, (and I am confirmed in it from what afterwards happened) would not have taken the Alarm at any *Preparations* we could have made; for they had *so often before* seen us make great Preparations, when we did not so much as intend to make an *angry Use* of them, that very probably we might have *caught them napping*; which was an Advantage we might have drawn from our *many former expensive Preparations*; and then it could have been no longer said, that they were *quite useless*.

— If we had intercepted the *Azogues* and *Caracca* Ships, before the *Spaniards* began to suspect any Thing of our Intentions, some of the elegant Authors in the *Gazeteer* might have insisted, with more Reason than usually appears in that Paper, upon the great Use a Nation may make of expensive Preparations which, *at the Time they are made*, appear to *vulgar Eyes* to be quite useless. — But the *Patron* of that Paper seems resolved, that they shall never have the *least Appearance* of an Argument to make Use of, in Favour of *his Management*; and therefore I am so far from despising, that I really pity these *poor Authors*, when I see them wriggling round the little Compass of their Wit and Understanding, to find *Excuses* and *Panegyrics* for the *Conduct* of such an obstinate and unreasonable, tho' bountiful Patron.

With such Preparations and such a Disposition of our naval Force, as I have mentioned, I believe 'twill be allowed, that it would have been impossible for the *Spaniards* to have taken near the Number of our *Merchant Ships* they have done. — It would have been almost impossible for any of their *Privateers* to have set their Noses to the Sea: At least if they had, we should probably have had a good Account of them before they could return into Port:

And if we had thus taken Care that it should not have been in their Power to make any Advantage of the War, the *Losses* they must have met with, and the *Difficulties* they must have been reduced to, would soon have made them *weary of it*.

Having thus shewn what Preparations we ought to have made for our *Defense* at Sea, and for *intercepting* the Trade of the Enemy, I shall next shew what Methods we ought, in my humble Opinion, to have taken in *commencing* and *prosecuting* the War.—For this Purpose I must observe, that, as the *Spaniards* had a Term of *four Months* for making that new sort of *prompt Payment* which was stipulated by the Convention, we were obliged to wait till the *24th* of *May*, the last Day of that Term, before we could issue Letters of *Reprisal*, or send any Orders to our Men of War to commit *Hostilities*.—However, as we had great Reason to suspect, that this *prompt Payment* would not be made within the Term limited, and were resolved, as I hope we were, not to grant a new Term, we ought, as I have said, to have begun our Preparations by the *End of March* at farthest, and upon the *25th* of *May* we ought to have dispatched Orders to our Commodore in the *West Indies*, to have begun to make *Reprisals*; but our Orders for making *Reprisals*, both in *Europe* and *America*, should have been issued and managed in a *very different manner* from what they were, for these Reasons.

We were no way obliged to give the *Spaniards* Notice of our having issued *Reprisals*; but on the contrary we should have concealed it as much, and as long as we possibly could, that we might have had some rich Prizes in our Hands, before the *Spaniards* could have the least Pretence to make any *unjust Reprisals* upon us; for as we had done them no Injury *since the Treaty of Seville*, they had no just Title to make any *Reprisals* upon us, and  
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could not have so much as a Pretence for doing so, till they had heard of our having begun to make *Reprisals* upon them, which they could not have heard of, till after we had prepared, for preventing its being in their Power to return the Compliment upon us.——Another Reason is, because the *Spaniards* have no Ships in *Europe* that are worth taking but those that are bound to or from the *West-Indies*; and none of those Ships were expected to sail from *Europe* to the *West-Indies*, nor were any rich Ships expected from thence in the *European* Seas, till towards the *End of July*; so that we could not expect to make any considerable Advantage, by giving Orders for making *Reprisals* before that Time; but on the contrary, by making *Reprisals* upon their *small Craft*, we gave them Notice to keep their *rich Ships* out of our Way.——And a third Reason is this, as we had, or might have had a sufficient Number of *Men of War*, both in the *European* and *American* Seas, for making *Reprisals*, there was no Occasion for granting any Letters of *Marque* to *private Men*, and much less for publishing any Proclamation for that purpose: Nay, from our Conduct in 1727, we could not expect that any *private Adventurers* would put themselves to the Expence of fitting out Vessels proper for making *Reprisals*; so that the publishing of such a Proclamation could do us no Service, and would certainly do us Harm, by putting the *Spaniards* upon their Guard, and affording them a Pretence to seize such of our Merchant Ships as were in their Ports or Harbours; therefore, I think, 'tis evident, that no such Proclamation should have been issued, at least in *Europe*, till we had actually declared War.

With regard therefore to the issuing and executing Orders for making *Reprisals*, we should, in my Opinion, have taken this Method.——On the 25th of May, as before-mentioned, we ought to have



have dispatched Orders for this Purpose to our Commodore in the *West-Indies* ; but these Orders ought to have been accompanied with Instructions, to keep them as private as possible, to avoid appearing in a hostile Manner within view of any of the *Spanish* Settlements in that Part of the World, and to keep at Sea, with such Prizes as they should take, as long as possible, in order to avoid giving the Alarm.

Then with regard to *Europe*, it was quite unnecessary to give Orders for making *Reprisals* to our Men of War stationed in the *Mediterranean* or any of the *European* Seas, before the *Middle of July* ; tho' it would perhaps have been proper, even before that time, to have sent private Orders to Admiral Haddock to keep a Look out, and to seize any rich Ship he should find sailing to, or returning from the *Spanish West-Indies*, but with express Instructions to keep these Orders as secret as possible, and to avoid, as much as he could, giving the least Umbrage to the *Spaniards* ; and that in case any such Ship should fall in his way, he should immediately send Advice of it to our Consul at *Cadiz*, that he might give Notice to the *British* Ships in that, and the other Ports of *Spain*, to depart forthwith ; and that he should, at the same time, send Advice home of what had happened, that the Cruizers and small Ships, designed for the Protection of our Trade, might be immediately ordered to sail for their respective Stations.

If no such Prize had fallen in Admiral Haddock's way before the *middle of July*, which would probably have been the Case, it would then, and not till then, have been time to have begun to act openly in *Europe* ; and therefore, about that time, we should have sent out all the Men of War, small Ships and Sloops, designed for the Protection of our Trade, to their several Stations before mentioned ; and some additional Men of War ought to have been sent for  
a month



a month or two, to the northern Coast of Spain, to intercept the *Azogues* Ships in their Return ; so that from the southernmost Point of Portugal to *Fontarabia* in Spain, or rather to the Mouth of the *Garon* in France, we might have had Men of War, twenty Gun Ships, and armed Sloops, stationed almost within sight of one another ; which would have made it almost impossible for the *Azogues* Ships to have escaped us, unless some of those *Political Fogs* had been cast before our Eyes, which have formerly been of so great Use, for preserving the *Tranquillity* of our Administration, and encouraging the *Spaniards* to disturb that of the Nation.

At the same Time that we sent out our Ships to be stationed upon the Coast of Spain and Portugal, we ought to have sent particular and express Orders to all *British* Ships in any of the *Spanish* Ports, to depart immediately ; and our stationed Ships should have had Instructions to hail every *British* Ship they saw at sea, and inform them of the Rupture, which would have preserved several of our *Merchant Ships* that went heedlessly into the *Spanish* Ports, after the Rupture was known in Spain, and were of *Course* there seized and made Prize of. — But as it was very much our Interest upon several Accounts, to prevent its being in the Power of the *Spaniards* to make any Advantage of the War, as a farther Precaution, Orders should have been dispatched on the 25th of May to all our Colonies on the Continent of *America*, not to send any of their Ships to Spain, till fresh Advices from *Great Britain* ; because in the Months of *August*, *September*, and *October*, many of their Ships usually arrive in Spain with Fish, and the other Productions of those Parts of *America*.

The Rupture being now made, and all proper Measures taken, both for protecting our own Trade and annoying that of the Enemy, it was high Time

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to begin to put in Execution such Schemes as were necessary for bringing about a *speedy* and *honourable* Peace; for after the Rupture was once known thro' all the Dominions of *Spain*, 'twas ridiculous to think of doing the Enemy much Hurt at Sea; because we might have foreseen, that few or none of their Ships would put to Sea, unless it was *Advice Boats* and *Privateers*, the taking of which might be of great Service but little Advantage to us; nor could it occasion any great Loss to the Enemy, except that of disappointing them in their Measures for distressing our Trade.—Therefore as soon as we saw that a War would be the necessary Consequence of the Disputes between the two Nations, which was, as I have supposed, about the *End of March* last, we should have begun to provide for putting such Schemes in Execution, as would be effectual for procuring us *speedily* that Reparation, Satisfaction, and Security, which we were *so justly* intitled to, and which had been *so long*, and *so contemptuously* denied us.

For this Purpose we should have begun to raise *Marines*, and to augment our Land-Forces by the *End of March* at farthest; so that by the *End of August*, we might have had 6000 *Marines* on board our Men of War, and *four or five and forty thousand* regular Troops in *Britain* and *Ireland*.—By disposing of our *Marines* properly on board our Ships of War, and encouraging able bodied *Landmen* to enter into his Majesty's Sea Service, we might have prevented our being under a Necessity of drawing *too many* Seamen away from our Trade; and by such an Augmentation of our Land Forces, we might have spared 14 or 15000 of our *best Troops* to have been sent upon some Expedition for attacking *Spain* at Land, and in that Part where we might most probably meet with Advantage and Success, which I believe every one will allow to be in the  
West-

*West-Indies.*—And that we might have been ready to have set out upon such an Expedition as soon as we declared War, we should have begun to contract for Transports, and prepare for victualling them, by the *Beginning of June*, so as that they might have been all ready to sail by the *End of September* at farthest, for the Reasons I shall presently mention.

As it would have been in some measure necessary for us to declare our selves openly by the *End of July*; therefore, soon after we had sent the Cruizers, small Ships, and Sloops, necessary for protecting our Trade, to the Coasts of *Spain*, we should then, *and not before*, have published a *Proclamation* for granting Letters of *Marque* to such as should apply for them; tho' even then no great Advantage could be expected from it; but we should have reaped this Advantage from it, that it would have made *Spain* publish such another, as we find it actually did; and as they had no Right to issue any such Letters of *Marque*, or to make any Reprisals, we ought to have made their doing so a Reason, as it really was *a most just one*, for declaring War in form; for after the two Nations had once come to an open Rupture, it was *our Business* to declare War as soon as possible; because, till then, we could not pretend to prevent our Neighbours from carrying *contraband Goods* to *Spain*, nor could we, according to the most strict Rules of Honour, send out an Army to attack the Enemy at Land, either in *Europe* or *America*; and as the *Month of August or September* is the proper, *and the only proper* Season for sending out a Fleet and an Army, to attack them in *America*, therefore we ought to have brought the *Rupture* to an *open Declaration of War* by that time.

My Reasons for saying that the *Month of August or September* is the *proper* Season for sending out a Fleet and Land Army to attack the *Spaniards* in *America*, are these. *First*, About that Time of the Year the Air is more temperate than it is either in

Summer or Winter ; and therefore the Soldiers could not suffer so much by being penn'd up in Transports, as they would do in the Summer or Winter Months. Secondly, They would probably be landed in some of the *Spanish* Settlements in the *West-Indies* in the Month of *November* or *December*, which is the coldest Season of the Year in all the *Spanish* Settlements on this side of the Continent of *America* ; so that they would probably have done their Business before the hot Season came on ; and would by degrees be accustomed to bear the excessive Heats of the Summer in that Part of the World. And, Thirdly, The Months of *August* and *September* are in the *West-Indies* called the *Hurricane Months* ; because, during these Months, *Hurricanes* and *Tornado's* are frequent in those Seas, which makes it dangerous for a Fleet, especially a Fleet of Transports, to be sailing upon them during that Season ; but if our Fleet had set out in *August* or *September* last, this Season would have been intirely over before its Arrival in those Seas, and it might have got out of them again, in its Homeward Voyage, before the Return of that dangerous Season : unless it had been thought proper to keep our Fleet, or a great Part of it, in that Part of the World, for transporting a Body of Land Forces from one Settlement to another, in order to make new Conquests, or to bring new Distresses upon the Enemy.

From these Reasons it is manifest, that we cannot prudently send out a Fleet and Land Army, for making an Attack upon any of the *Spanish* Settlements on this side the Continent of *America*, but in the Month of *August* or *September* ; and if we were to make an Attack by Sea upon any of their Settlements on the other side of that Continent, the Fleet designed for that Purpose must take their Departure from hence in the Month of *August* or *September* at farthest ; because, as it would be obliged to sail round by the *Straits of Magellan*, the proper Season



Season for passing those Straights is about the Time of our Winter Solstice, which is the Summer Solstice in that Part of the World, when those Straights may be passed without Danger; whereas, about the Time of our Summer Solstice, which is the Winter Solstice in the Southern Hemisphere, not only the Straights but the Seas in that Part of the World are sometimes so full of Ice, that 'tis dangerous to attempt passing them, or even to sail round by *Cape Horn*, the Southernmost Point of *America*.

Now as we cannot propose to *compel* the *Spaniards* to agree to reasonable Terms, or to make any Conquests upon them that can be of Advantage to this Nation, but by attacking their Settlements in *America*; we should have thought of this, and begun to prepare for it, as soon as we saw, that a War would be the necessary Consequence of our Disputes with them.—If we had done this, we might have been ready by the *End of August* to have embarked 12000 of our *best Troops*, which, in my Opinion, is the *smallest* Number that ought to be sent upon such an Expedition; because it would be of the most dangerous Consequence to the Nation to miscarry in any such Expedition; therefore, if this Number of Troops had not been thought fully sufficient for the Purpose intended, a greater Number should have been sent, or a Reinforcement prepared to have been sent soon after; and particularly we ought to have taken care to have the Troops we sent thither provided with *Cloathing fit for a March in that hot Country*; for I must observe, that the *Cloathing* they have in *this* Country would be very *unfit* for them in *that*; which I hope those whose Duty it is will take *proper Care of*, if we ever do send any Troops to that Part of the World.

But in order to have rendered ourselves the more secure of Success, and to have saved the Publick Expence as much as possible, we should, the moment we declared War, have published a Proclamation,



promising all the Rewards and Encouragements we could give, to such *private Adventurers* and *Volunteers*, as should join in the intended Expedition; which we might have done without declaring the Place against which it was designed.—And at the same Time we ought to have sent Orders to *all our Colonies in America*, to raise as many Men as they could spare, and to have them ready to rendezvous at *St. Christopher's* or *Antigua*, some Time in the Month of *November*.

By these Means, we might have invaded the *Spanish Settlements in America* with an Army of at least 20,000 Men; and such an Army, with the Assistance they might, and would certainly have met with from our Seamen, would, in all human Probability, have been sufficient, not only for taking, but holding, any of those Settlements we might have thought most convenient and advantageous for this Nation.—Nay, as the *Spaniards* could no Way guard against this Danger, by sending any Relief or Assistance from *Old Spain*, the very Apprehension of it might have forced them to give us a Sort of *Carte Blanche*; which would have restored the Honour and Character of this Nation at every Court in *Europe*, and would have secured the *Freedom* of our *Trade* and *Navigation* in all Parts of the World, much better than it is possible for us to do by any *Treaty we can make*; for when foreign Nations saw, that we not only *would resent*, but *could punish* any Injury offered to our Trade, they would, all of them, have been cautious of giving us the least Touch in so tender a Part.

These are the chief Methods, which, in my humble Opinion, we ought to have taken in the *Commencement* and *Prosecution* of the present War; and after having thus fairly and openly given my Opinion as to *what ought to have been done*, I think myself at the more Freedom to examine *what has been actually done*; for if I *censure*, I have first exposed myself so  
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be censured, which, I hope, will be allowed to be, putting the Question in Debate upon *as equal* a footing as possible. — My next Business therefore shall be, to consider the Methods we have *hitherto actually* taken ; but before I begin, I must observe, that it has always been reckoned ridiculous in any Nation to declare War, till they were fully prepared to undertake some important Expedition against the Enemy ; and this Method of beginning a War is now become more usual than it was in antient Times. — The Declaration of War is generally now accompanied with an Army, and often *first published* by an Army's entering the Territories of the Enemy. — It is needless to bring many Examples from History for proving this to be the general Practice. — I shall mention only two, as being the most apposite to the Case in hand. — In the 27th Year of *Queen Elizabeth*, that wise Queen foresaw the Storm that was gathering against her, *tho' it was then at a great Distance*. — She, by the Vigilance and Dexterity of her Ministers abroad, had pryed into the secret Alliance, formed against her and the Protestant Religion, by the Kings of *France* and *Spain*. — Such a Project, 'tis now plain from History, they had formed ; but before they could carry it into Execution against her, it was necessary for them to reduce and destroy the Protestants in their own Dominions, and to gain over to their Interest the King of *Scotland*, which they had then some hopes of. — Upon this, that great Queen wisely and bravely resolved to support the Protestants in *France* and the *Netherlands*, let the Consequence be what it would ; and at the same time she began to take Measures for securing the King of *Scotland* in her Interest, or otherwise, to give him enough to do at home. — If she had sent *Fools upon her Errands to foreign Nations*, or if she had been so fond of *Peace* as to allow her Enemies to compleat their Schemes against her, by the *Destruction of her Friends abroad*, an End would very probably

probably have been soon put to her Reign, and to the Protestant Religion ; but by the Art and Vigilance of her Ministers *abroad*, she *discovered* the Designs of her Enemies, and by the Wisdom and Resolution of her Ministers *at home*, she *disappointed* them.

By sending a *well chosen* Minister to *Scotland*, and *some other proper* Measures, she secured that King in her Interest. — About the same Time she made a Treaty with those Provinces of the Low Countries that had united together for throwing off the Yoke of *Spain* ; and, soon after, sent them a powerful Aid. — Tho' she pretended that her Conduct in this particular was founded upon, and in Pursuance of the antient Treaties between *England* and those Provinces, and therefore no Breach of any of her Treaties with *Spain* ; yet she was too wise, not to foresee, that it would occasion an open Rupture between her and the King of *Spain* ; for which Reason she resolved to be beforehand with him. — In Pursuance of this Resolution, before she sent any Forces into the *Netherlands*, or took any other Step that might be looked on by *Spain* as a Declaration of War, she made *all the necessary Preparations* for the Execution of her Design against *Spain* itself, and about the same Time that she sent her Forces over to *Holland*, she sent out a Fleet with 2300 *Land Forces* on board, to attack the *Spanish* Settlements in *America*, which they accordingly did, and after doing infinite Mischief to the Enemy, returned with a vast Booty.

This was *Queen Elizabeth's* Conduct at the Commencement of her War with *Spain* ; and this sort of Conduct was *continued* during the rest of her Reign. — She did not content herself with carrying on a *Pyratical War* only against that Nation : The Fleets and Armies she sent out often landed and plundered their Coasts, in *Old Spain* as well as upon both Sides of the Continent of *America* ; and yet *England* was not at that Time near so powerful

as it is now, and *Spain* much more powerful : Nay, they were then a superior Match for us at Sea, which is far from being the Case at present.

The next War we had with *Spain* happened during the Protectorship of *Oliver Cromwell*. — Whether it was just, or agreeable to the Interest of this Nation, is none of my Business to determine. — Be that as it will, when the *Protector* resolv'd on a War with *Spain*, he did not begin with *Proclamations* or *verbal Declarations* ; nor did he put the Nation to the Expence of any Preparations, either by Sea or Land, but what were *actually* and *immediately* employ'd against the Enemy. — He did not so much as *seem to be afraid* of an *Invasion* ; yet surely there was *then* a more general *Disaffection* in the Nation, than any Man will or dare say there is *at present*. — He began with sending one Fleet to the *Mediterranean*, under Pretence of chastising the *Algerines*, but really with a View to *protect our Trade* in that Part of the World, during the War he intended to carry on against *Spain* ; and the *only other Squadron* he prepar'd, was sent out, with 5000 *Land Forces* on board, and with Instructions which they were not to open till they came to such a certain Latitude. These Instructions, when opened, were found to be most *skilfully* drawn up, for attacking the *Spaniards* in *St. Domingo* ; otherwise call'd *Hispaniola*, and for taking Possession of that Island, which would probably have succeeded, had not the General committed a most egregious Blunder, *expressly contrary to his Instructions*, by landing his Forces at a great Distance from the Town of *St. Domingo* ; and this Blunder, I must confess, was of the more pernicious Consequence, because of the Fleet's having been sent from *England too late in the Year* ; for it ought to have been sent out in *September*, whereas it did not depart till the 27th of *December*, which, with its *long stay* at *Barbadoes*, was the reason of its not arriving at *Hispaniola* till *April*, when the hot Season

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in that Climate begins to be extremely troublesome to Men bred in the moderate Climate of *Great Britain*.——However, they did not entirely miss of their Aim; for they took and kept Possession of *Jamaica*, which has since brought in many Millions to this Kingdom.

These two Examples will, I hope, justify what I have said, with regard to the Measures we *ought* to have taken at the *Commencement*, and in the *Prosecution* of the present War; but having mentioned *Queen Elizabeth's* Wisdom in foreseeing, and taking Care to dissipate the Storm that was beginning to gather against her in the 27th of her Reign, I must from thence take Occasion to observe, and make some Remarks upon the Circumstances of this Nation and the rest of *Europe* in the Year 1733.——By the Treaties of *Hanover* and *Seville* (neither of which could be of any great Advantage to this Nation, but both greatly for the Advantage of *France*, and both, I believe, we were led into by *French* Artifice) we had firmly united the Courts of *France* and *Spain*, and thrown such a *Bone of Contention* between the latter and the Court of *Vienna*, as we could, it seems, no Way remove, but by entering into a *general* and *absolute* Guarantee of the *Emperor's Pragmatick Sanction*, which we did, by our Treaty with his Imperial Majesty concluded at *Vienna* in the Year 1731.——By this Guarantee we in a manner divided *Europe* into two Parties: *France*, *Spain*, and probably *Sardinia*, and some of the Princes of *Germany* upon one Side; and on the other, the *Emperor*, *Muscovy*, and *Great Britain*, with, the *States General*, and such of the other Potentates of *Europe* as we could engage of our Party.——This was the System the Affairs of *Europe* were thrown into by our Treaty with the *Emperor* in 1731; and under Colour and in Confidence of the Guarantee we then agreed to, we prevailed with him to consent to the Introduction of *Spanish* Troops into the strong Places of  
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of *Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia* ; for as he foresaw the *Consequence* of *that Introduction*, he would never have *peaceably* admitted of it, if he had not depended upon our securing him against *that Consequence*, in Pursuance of the *general Guarantee* we had engaged in.

If we had cultivated the Alliance formed between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, by their Treaty in 1725. instead of dissolving it by our Treaty of *Hanover*, and the Measures we took after *that Treaty*, we should have had no occasion to throw the Affairs of *Europe* into the System I have mentioned, or to trouble our Heads much with any of the Disputes that might happen in *Europe*, perhaps for many Years after. — The *Queen* of *Spain* would not have so much as thought of the Kingdom of the two *Sicilies* for her Son *Don Carlos* ; she would have contented herself with the Possession of the fine Dutchies of *Tuscany, Parma* and *Placentia* ; and she would have depended upon the *Emperor* for protecting her in that Possession. — This would have united the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* still more and more ; and the *Emperor* and *Spain* would have been a Match for *France*, without much Assistance from us. —

They might perhaps upon Occasion have stood in need of our Fleet ; and this would have obliged both to court our Friendship. — But after having reunited the Courts of *France* and *Spain*, and raised a Jealousy between the latter and the Court of *Vienna*, it became necessary for us to throw the Affairs of *Europe* into this System, in order to keep up a Balance of Power in *Europe* ; and besides, it became necessary even for our own particular Safety ; for as we then saw, that *Spain* would give us no Satisfaction for the many Depredations her *Guarda Costa's* had committed upon our Merchants, nor give up the Right she pretended to, of interrupting our Navigation, and searching our Ships in the *American Seas*, and even seizing and confiscating them upon the fri-

volour Pretence of *Contraband Goods*; and as we had *then* some Reason to suppose, that in these unjust Pretensions, *Spain* would be supported by *France*; we were under a Necessity to provide for our own Safety, by forming a Party upon the Continent, sufficient for opposing, with our Assistance, the united Power of *France* and *Spain*.

In this Light therefore, our becoming Guarantee for the *pragmatic Sanction*, and thereby entering into a Sort of Alliance with the *Emperor* and *Muscovy*, may be considered as a wise and necessary Measure; tho' I am now convinced, it was thought on by some People, only as a temporary Expedient for getting free of that Dilemma, into which we had thrown ourselves by the Treaty of *Seville*, with Regard to the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* into the strong Places of *Tuscany*, *Parma*, and *Placentia*, instead of the neutral Troops stipulated by the *quadruple Alliance*; for if it had been thought on as a Measure to be steadily pursued, it became absolutely necessary for us to take proper Measures, in Conjunction with the *Emperor* and *Muscovy*, for securing *Poland* in our Interest, in order to render the Alliance between the *Emperor* and *Muscovy* the more effectual, by giving them an Opportunity to join their Forces, as soon and as often as Occasion might require.

What we did in this, I shall not pretend to determine.—It was not thought proper even to let our Parliament into the Secret.—But *Muscovy*, we know, took proper and effectual Measures; and this brought the War upon the *Emperor*, which was begun, without the least Provocation on his Part, towards the latter End of the Year 1733, the late King of *Poland* having died the Beginning of that Year.—What Excuse we might then have for not engaging in this War, is, I confess, beyond my Reach; for to me it appears, that we were in Honour, as well as by Treaty, obliged to assist the *Emperor*: Nay, for our own Sake, we were, I think, obliged

obliged to assist him; for what Justice, what Satisfaction, could we expect from *Spain*, as to any of the Disputes *then* subsisting between the two Nations, if the *Emperor* should, by our Indolence, be obliged to accept of any Terms his Enemies should be pleased to grant him? In my Opinion, there was nothing more easily to be foreseen, than that this Nation would be *the next Sacrifice*; and therefore, if we had imitated the wise *Queen Elizabeth*, we certainly would have *flown* to the Assistance of the *Emperor*, at the very Beginning of the War; for we could not but foresee, that *the longer* we delayed, *the more heavy* the War would fall upon us.

Surely, it was not Fear that prevented our engaging; for a close Alliance between *Muscovy*, *Poland*, *Germany*, and *Great Britain*, would have been able to give Laws to *Europe*.——Most of the other Powers of *Europe*, except *France* and *Spain*, would have gladly joined in the Alliance; and in that Case, we should have been able, not only to have settled all our Disputes both with *France* and *Spain* to our own liking, but to have put it out of the Power of either, to have disturbed us in our Trade or Navigation for many Years, perhaps forever after.——I am not ignorant, that the Neutrality the *Dutch* had agreed to, was at that Time assigned as a Reason for our not assisting the *Emperor*.——Our engaging in a War against *France* and *Spain*, whilst the *Dutch* remained *neutral*, was represented as being of the most dangerous Consequence to our Trade.——How the *Dutch* came to agree to that Treaty of *Neutrality*, or whether it was not occasioned by the *Opinion* they had formed of our Conduct, or some Intimation they had of our secret Resolutions, I shall not pretend to answer; but surely, we are not in all Cases to measure our Conduct by that of the *Dutch*.——We might perhaps have reaped more Advantages by engaging in the War *without* the *Dutch* than *with* them; because we should then

have been at Liberty to have pushed the War in the *West-Indies*, without Controul from any of our *Allies*; and by conquering some of the *Spanish* Settlements, and destroying those of the *French*, in that Part of the World, our Trade would have gained more than it could have suffered by the War.——But what rendered this Objection of no Weight was, that we might then have foreseen, that in a few Years we should be obliged to engage in a War with *Spain*, perhaps both with *France* and *Spain*, at the Time when the *Dutch* might probably enjoy a perfect *Tranquillity*.——This, in my Opinion, ought to have determined us to engage, without the least Regard to what the *Dutch* might do; for 'twas certainly better for us to engage at that Time, when we were sure of powerful *Allies*, than run the Risk of being in a few Years obliged to stand single and alone, in a War against the united Power of *France* and *Spain*.

Upon that Occasion, 'tis true, we fitted out *Squadrons*, and raised new *Armies*, but those *Squadrons* and *Armies*, like some of our preceding Armaments, served only to drain our own *Coffers*.——We took no effectual Measures for supporting that System of Affairs in *Europe*, which, as I have already shewn, we had, by our Treaties of *Hanover* and *Seville*, rendered necessary for our own *Safety*: Nay, we did not so much as take that Opportunity to insist *peremptorily* upon, for if we had, we should certainly have obtained, full *Satisfaction*, *Reparation*, and *Security*, from *Spain*, so that at last, with empty *Coffers*, as was declared by one Gentleman, and without one *Ally*, as was declared by another, we found ourselves obliged to engage in a War against *Spain*, at a Time when we knew, that *Spain* would be *privately*, if not *openly* assisted by *France*.

But why should I say, we found ourselves obliged?——It was not by Accident, 'twas not by the *causeless* Obstinacy of *Spain*, that we were obliged to enter into the present War.——It was originally



originally occasioned by a *Mistake* and a *Want of Vigour* in our own Conduct.——The *Spaniards* certainly have a Right to seize any *British Ship*, they find carrying on an illicit Trade with their Settlements in *America*.——But when a *British Ship* has been seized and confiscated upon that Pretence, the Court of *Spain*, and much less their Governors in the *West-Indies*, cannot pretend to be the sole and supreme Judges, whether that Pretence be well founded.——When Complaint is made to our Court, that a *British Ship* has been unjustly seized upon that Pretence, and Justice denied or delayed in the ordinary Course of Law in *Spain*, which is a Complaint that must be made to our Court, before the Ship can be formally reclaimed by his Majesty, our Ministers have a Right to judge whether the Pretence of Seizure be well founded, and they are in Duty bound to examine strictly into the Truth of the Facts alledged, before they advise his Majesty to reclaim.——We put an Indignity upon ourselves, if we reclaim without a just Foundation.——But when we do reclaim, it is a much higher Indignity, it is behaving like a little petty-fogging Norfolk Attorney, to allow the Court of *Spain*, or any Court in the World, to contest the Fact with us.——We ought then to accept of no Excuse, no conditional Orders for Satisfaction and Reparation to the Party injured; and if Satisfaction for the Affront, and full Reparation for all Costs and Damages, be not actually made within six Months, the Term limited for that Purpose by Treaties between *Spain* and us, we ought to grant Letters of *Marque* to the Party injured, or we ought to give Orders to our Men of War to make *Reprisals*.——This is the Duty of every independent Nation in every such Case; and if we had taken this Method, when the *Spaniards* first began to search and seize our Merchant Ships upon false Pretences of illicit Trade, we should have had no more of it.——They would not have declared



clared War against us, on Account of our making *Reprisals* in a regular Way, for *one single Ship*, nor would they in such a Case have issued *counter Reprisals*. If they had, we should have entered into the War *at that Time*, with more Advantage than we do *at this*, and I am sure, *with less Loss, and more Honour*.

The *Obstinacy* the *Spaniards* have shewn, I may therefore justly say, is not *causeless*.——A *Pusillanimity* in our Conduct, has been the *Cause of an Obstinacy* in theirs.——No Court in the World will expressly order their Subjects to make Satisfaction and Restitution, if they are not compelled to give such Orders by a *peremptory Demand* from the Court whose Subjects have been injured.——If we had made such a Demand for the *first British Ship* that was *unjustly seized*, it would have been complied with; but by *our accepting conditional Orders*, and *their continuing their Depredations*, our Demands at last amounted to such a Sum as was worth the while of Nations to contend for; and thus we have, by *our own Conduct*, been involved in the present War; in the *Commencement and Prosecution* of which, I have already shewn, what Measures *we ought*, in my humble Opinion, to have taken.——Whether they would have been prudent or not, will best appear from comparing them with the Measures *we have taken*; and therefore I shall now proceed to give a compendious History of our Conduct, since the *End of March* last, so far as it appears from publick Papers; for, thank God! I am not acquainted with *any Secrets of State*.

From the *End of March* to the Beginning of *June*, I do not find the least mention made in our News Papers of *any Preparations* for War, nor can I learn by any Sort of Intelligence, that we began to make such, *either in a publick or private Manner*; from whence I must conclude, that for *two Months* after we were well assured of a War's being *inevitable*, we  
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made no Preparations for it, and consequently, that we lost *two entire Months*, which should have been employed in raising *Marines*, augmenting our Land and Sea Forces, and in repairing our *20 Gun Ships*, and *Sloops*, or *building new ones*; because, these were the Ships, which, in a *War with Spain*, we should have most Occasion for.

Soon after the Beginning of *June*, indeed, *ten* Regiments of Foot were ordered from *Ireland*, but for what Purpose I cannot comprehend; for no Man could think we were at that Time in any *real* Danger of a *formidable* Invasion upon any Part of *Great Britain*, and *18000* regular Troops, or even a smaller Number, are always sufficient to repel any Number of foreign Troops that can at *unawares* be thrown in upon us.——In my Opinion, we should have *sent ten* Regiments of Foot to *Ireland*, which by proper Augmentations we might have spared, under Pretence of being afraid of an Invasion in that Kingdom, instead of *bringing ten* Regiments from thence; and my Reason is, because the Port of *Cork* in *Ireland* is the most proper Place of any in the *British* Dominions, for an Imbarkation against any of the Dominions of *Spain*, either in *Europe* or *America*.

About the same Time that these Regiments were ordered from *Ireland*, we began in the most publick Manner to prepare for War.——A *hot Press* for Seamen was begun:——An *Embargo* laid upon our Trade:——*Proclamations* published for encouraging Seamen to enter into his Majesty's Service, and for calling Home those in foreign Service:——*Orders* issued for making a great Addition at once to our Land Forces:——*Directions* given to our Lords Lieutenants to have the *Militia* in good Order:——The Right Honourable *Horatio Walpole, Esq;* his Lady and Family, sent upon an extraordinary *Ambassy* to *Holland*; and as great a Noise made through the whole Nation, as if we had been upon

upon the *Brink* of being invaded by a new *Spanish Armado*, or of entering upon one of the most dangerous and desperate Wars this Nation was ever engaged in.——These alarming Preparations we should have had no Occasion for, if we had begun to prepare about the *End of March*; and considering what has since happened, I can see no Effect they had, but that of distressing our Trade; preventing the usual Supply of Coals for the City of London, which has this Winter been most severely felt; amusing our own People, and giving Warning to our Enemies to take Care of themselves, which they did in the most effectual Manner they could, by sending eight or ten Advice Boats, one after another, which they were permitted to do without Interruption, to their *Azogues* Ships then upon their Return from *America*, to steer the most proper Course, for avoiding falling into the Hands of our Squadrons.

I shall grant, that when Admiral *Vernon* sailed the 2d Time from *Portsmouth*, if he had then proceeded directly upon his Voyage, if he had met with no Storm nor contrary Wind, he might perchance have met with the *Azogues* Ships: But if he had, it would not have been owing to his Instructions, so far as I have been informed, but by mere Accident; for those Ships had, by the Advice Boats sent them, received Orders to steer directly for the Island of *Ushant*, one of the Northernmost Points upon the West Coast of *Britany*, and from thence to steer along the Coast of *France*, till they came to the Northern Coast of *Spain*; to the End certainly, that in Case any of our Men of War had come up with them, they might have run into the next Port of *France*, or that, in Case of Necessity, they might have run themselves a Shoar upon the Coasts of that Kingdom, where they were sure of meeting with Protection. Now if Admiral *Vernon* had met with no Storm, nor contrary Wind, he might perhaps by Accident have been off the Island of *Ushant*, when the

the *Azogues* Ships were just making that Point, and by *this Chance* he might have intercepted them; but if he had been at that Time, or any other Time, in the Station where he was *ordered* to wait for them, it would have been impossible for him to get Sight of, much less to intercept them.

Thus it appears, that the *Azogues* Ships were not in the least Danger of being intercepted by any Measure we had *designedly* taken; and by the Storm Admiral *Vernon* met with, they were in no Danger of being taken, either by *Accident* or *Design*; for he sailed not from *Portland Road* till the *first* of *August*, and the *Azogues* Ships arrived safe at *St. Andero* in *Spain*, after having coasted along the whole Western Coast of *France*, the very next Day, that is, on the 2d of *August*.——The contrary Winds he met with has since, indeed, served us in good Stead, as an Excuse for our Disappointment with Regard to those Ships; but methinks 'twas trusting a little too much to the Winds, to put off the Departure of Admiral *Vernon's* Squadron, till the 23d of *July*, the Day he first sailed from *Portsmouth*; for suppose we have no *secret* Intelligence, suppose we are at no Charge for that Purpose, the *publick* Accounts we had from the *West-Indies* of the *Azogues* Ships gave us Reason to suppose, they would have been arrived before that Day at some of the Ports of *Spain*; and they certainly would have been so, had they steered their Course directly for *Vigo*, or any of the Ports in that Neighbourhood. Therefore, if they had fallen into our Hands, I may with some Reason say, it would have been owing to *their Caution* in endeavouring to avoid us, and our *Backwardness* in preparing to intercept them.

But now, to return to my intended History: As we began soon after the *first* of *June* to prepare openly for War, so I reckon that, about the same Time or soon after, Orders were sent to Admiral *Haddock* to make *Reprisals*; for towards the *End* of *June*, or



soon after the Beginning of *July*, he appeared in a *hostile Manner* before *Cadiz*, and notified his Orders to the *Spaniards* by making Prize of some of their *small Craft*; for which he certainly had *express Instructions*; for as no Man can doubt of that Gentleman's *Conduct* or *Courage*, if he had been left to himself, 'tis probable, he would have *delayed shewing his Teeth*, till he was sure *he could bite* in the most *sensible Part*.——But at last, in order to declare to the *Spaniards* our Intentions, in as *publick* and as *authentick* a Manner as possible, a *Proclamation* for *Reprisals* was issued on the 10th of *July*, and *immediately* published in all our News Papers; which was, in my Opinion, at least a *Month* too early; and what was still worse, it was published before we had sent a *sufficient Number* of War Ships to the Coasts of *Spain*, either to *intercept* their Trade or *protect* our own.

Upon this Occasion I must enforce what I have already hinted, that when Justice is refused or unreasonably delayed, a Nation may grant Letters of *Marque* to *private Men*, or may give Orders to their *Ships of War* to make *Reprisals* upon the Nation that refuses to do Justice; but it is no Way necessary to give Notice of their having done so, nor is it requisite, either by the Custom or Law of Nations, to issue such Orders in a *publick Manner*; and, I believe, a *Proclamation* for *general Reprisals*, except against a *publick declared Enemy*, was never published by any Nation but this, nor by this before the *happy Æra* of our *present glorious Administration*; therefore, such a *Proclamation* ought generally to be rather the *Consequence* than the *Forerunner* of a Declaration of War; and a Declaration of War ought always to be accompanied with an Attack in that Place where the greatest Hurt may be done to the Enemy.——If we had taken both the *Caracca* and *Azogues* Ships, nay if we had intercepted the *Flota* or *Galleons*, by Virtue of *private Orders* for making *Reprisals*, and before



fore any *Declaration of War*, the *Spaniards* could not have complained of any Breach of the Law of Nations; for they had not only most unreasonably delayed doing us Justice for many Years, but also, they had for many Years continued heaping Injury upon Injury, Insult upon Insult, and Cruelty upon Cruelty, till at last the Patience of our People, tho' I cannot say the Patience of our Ministers, could bear it no longer.

I shall for Brevity's Sake pass over several other Steps of our Conduct in *Europe*, which cannot, I think, be said to be altogether blameless; and now with Regard to our Conduct in *America*.——We sent away, 'tis true, our Orders for making *Reprisals* in *America* upon the 15th of *June*, at least they were of that Day's Date, which was near a Month before our publishing any Orders for that Purpose in *Europe*.——This was so far right; but why these Orders were not dispatched upon the 25th of *May*, is what I cannot account for; for I must think, we had long before that Time given over all Hopes of being able to do any Thing by our favourite Method of Negotiation.——We had certainly upon that Day a most justifiable Reason for issuing such Orders; and we had a Squadron and Guard Ships in *America*, sufficient for protecting our own Trade, and intercepting that of the Enemy.——If such Orders had been dispatched upon the 25th of *May*, and kept private as long as possible, we might have got Possession of some rich Prizes, before the *Spaniards* in that, or any other Part of the World, had heard of our Squadrons having such Orders.——But this, 'twould seem, was not our Design; for as soon as these Orders arrived, they were published in all our own Settlements in the *West-Indies*; and lest our own People should keep the Secret, which 'twas their Interest to do, our Commodore sailed from *Jamaica*, with five or six Men of War, and appeared in a hostile Manner, or committed some Act of Hostility,

before every one of the chief *Spanish* Ports in that Part of the World ; tho' he knew it was not in his Power to do the *least* Harm to any of their Settlements at Land, nor to any of the Ships in their Harbours.—For this he could not surely have Instructions ; because it was defeating the very Design of sending such Orders to the *West-Indies*, so long *before* they were published in *Europe*.—It could serve no Purpose but that of letting the *Spaniards* in those Parts know, that there was a Rupture between the two Nations, and that if they sent any Ships to Sea, they would probably be taken by *our Men of War*, or by the *armed Vessels* fitted out by *Private Adventurers* ; and, I believe, it has answered what seems to have been the Design ; for I fancy we shall hear of our not having had much better *Success* in the Seas of *America*, than we have had in those of *Europe*.

And as to our Exploits at Land in *America*, I must confess, I expect to hear no better Account of them. —We have sent, 'tis true, an Admiral, with an additional Number of Ships, to that Part of the World ; but we have sent *no regular Troops*, nor any sort of Force *proper* for making a vigorous and successful *Descent*.—Therefore, barring a few insignificant Incursions, I expect to hear of nothing but *another Bastimento's* Expedition ; and surely we do not intend to keep a Squadron hovering before the *Havana* or *Porto Bello*, as long as the War may last between us and *Spain*, which may be for this *Twenty Years*, unless it be *hereafter* pushed in a *different Manner* from what it has hitherto been.

Lastly with regard to our Conduct, in general, both in *Europe* and *America*, I must observe, that we have, in my humble Opinion, fitted out a *much greater* Number of *large Ships* of War, and a *much smaller* Number of *20 Gun Ships* and *armed Sloops* than we have occasion for in a War with *Spain* ; and even with regard to the Ships we have fitted out, I cannot

not think they were *disposed of* in the *most proper* Manner, either for *protecting* our own Trade, or *intercepting* that of *Spain*.——But whether it be so or not, will best appear from the following List of the Ships that were in Commission, and the Places at which they were stationed, in the *Month of August* last; which I have good Reason to believe to be a *true List*.

## Ships stationed at Home.

<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>
<i>Second,</i>	Namure.	<i>Fourth,</i>	Chatham.
<i>Third,</i>	Princess Caroline.		Dunkirk.
	Ruffel.		Ruby.
	Buckingham.		Severn.
	Grafton.		Advice.
	Prince of Orange.		Panther.
	Orford.		Tilbury.
	Boyne.		Defiance.
	Cumberland.		York.
	Princess Amelia.		Rippon.
	Norfolk.		Rocheffer.
<i>Fourth,</i>	Sunderland		Lichfield.
	Assistance.		Bristol.
	Newcastle.		Winchester.
	Portland.	<i>Fifth,</i>	Pearl.
	Lyon.		Ludlow.
	Superbe.	<i>Sloops,</i>	Bonetta.
	Weymouth.		Cruiser.
	Deptford.		Fly.
	Warwick.		Hound.
	Argyle.		Otter.
	Tyger.		Spy.
	Greenwich.		Trial.
	Centurion.		Swift.
	St. Albans.		Royal Escape.
	Colchester.		Alderny.
			Ships

Ships stationed in the *Mediterranean*.

<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>
<i>Third,</i>	Somerset.	<i>Fourth,</i>	Augusta.
	Lancaster.		Pembroke.
	Berwick.		Jersey.
	Edinburgh.		Oxford.
	Ipswich.	<i>Fifth,</i>	Eltham.
	Lenox.	<i>Sixth,</i>	Dursley.
	Elizabeth.		Dolphin.
	Kent.		Greyhound.
<i>Fourth,</i>	Canterbury.		Garland.
	Dragon.		Kennington.
	Plymouth.		Alborough.
	Glocester.		Solebay.
	Chester.		Grampus.
	Falkland.		

Ships stationed at *Jamaica*.

<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>
<i>Third,</i>	Burford.	<i>Fifth,</i>	Diamond.
	Hampton Court.		Torrington.
<i>Fourth,</i>	Windsor.	<i>Sixth,</i>	Sheerness.
	Worcester.		Shoreham.
	Strafford.		Blandford.
	Princess Louisa.	<i>Sloops,</i>	Drake.
	Falmouth.		Spence.
	Norwich.		

Ships stationed at *Newfoundland*.

<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>
<i>Fourth,</i>	Rumney.	<i>Sixth,</i>	Deal Castle.
<i>Fifth,</i>	Adventure.		

Ships

Ships stationed in the *West-Indies* in general,  
and in *Africa*.

<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Stations.</i>
<i>Fourth,</i>	Salisbury.	<i>Africa.</i>
<i>Fifth,</i>	Roebuck.	<i>Barbadoes.</i>
	Anglesea. }	<i>Antigua.</i>
	Lowestoffe. }	<i>Virginia.</i>
	Hector.	<i>New York.</i>
<i>Sixth,</i>	Flamborough.	<i>New England.</i>
	Squirrel.	
	Phoenix. }	<i>Carolina.</i>
	Tartar. }	<i>Leeward Islands.</i>
	Saltafh.	<i>Virginia.</i>
<i>Sloops,</i>	Wolf.	<i>Georgia.</i>
	Hawk.	

Having now given, as I at first proposed, an Account of the Methods which, in my humble Opinion, we *ought to have taken*, and likewise of the principal Methods we have *actually taken*, in the *Commencement* and *Prosecution* of the present War, I shall proceed to consider the Objections and Difficulties that may perhaps be started, as to the *Possibility* or *Prudence* of our taking the Methods I have proposed.

With regard to the *Possibility* of our taking such Methods, it may in the first Place be said, that it was impossible for us to raise *Seamen* or *Marines* for our *Navy*, or *Recruits* for our *Army*, *so quickly* as to fit out the Number of Ships by the Time I have proposed, and much less to go upon any Expedition in the Month of *August* or *September last*.

Upon this Head I must confess, that the many *pacific* Squadrons we have of *late Years* fitted out, and the Treatment our *Sailors* have met with, has rendered them all *very much averse* to his Majesty's Service; and the *Uses* we have made of our *Army*, together with some Practices lately introduced, relating

to



to the *Preferment* of *Officers*, and the *Clothing* and *Pay* of *Soldiers*, has, I'm afraid, made *that Service* disagreeable to many Men of true Honour and Courage, who would otherwise be ambitious of serving their Country. But there was such a Spirit among our People in general, to serve against the *Spaniards*, that, if we had begun in *March last* to prepare, I am convinced we should have had both *Seamen* and *Landmen* sufficient for all the Purposes I have mentioned by the *End of August*; and the Facility our *Officers* have met with in raising *Recruits* both for the *Marine* and *Marching Regiments* confirms me in this Opinion.—As for our Navy there were more *Seamen* actually in his Majesty's Service before the *End of July last*, than would have been necessary for all the *Naval Preparations* I have proposed.—By what I have proposed, we should have had occasion for but 26790 Men in the whole, on board the Navy; and it was far from being necessary to have all these *thorough bred Seamen*.—One third of a *War Ship's* Complement at least, may consist of *Marines* and able-bodied *Landmen*; so that we should not have had use for above 18000 *Seamen*; and it was computed that upon the 11th of *July last*, there were 26500 Men in his Majesty's *Sea Service*, the far greatest Part of which were *real Seamen*; for every one knows, how shy our *regulating Captains* were to accept of any *Landmen*. Therefore, if we had begun in *March last*, we might, before the *End of August*, have had both *Seamen* and *Landmen* sufficient for all I have proposed.

In the next Place, it may be objected against the Possibility of the Measures I have proposed, that as we have a *Pretender* to our Crown, and a *disaffected Party* in the Kingdom, we were in Danger of an *Invasion*, and therefore 'twas necessary to provide for our defending ourselves, before we could think of offending the Enemy; and that for this Reason it was absolutely necessary to augment our Land Forces,

Forces, and to fit out a great Number of large Men of War, in order to have a good Army at Land, and a formidable Squadron upon *our own Coasts*, for preventing an *Invasion*, which rendered it impossible for us to fit out such a Number of *small Ships* as I have proposed, or to send such a Number of our *best Troops* upon any Expedition in the Month of *August* or *September* last.

By way of answer to this Objection I shall first most readily grant, that whilst we have a *Pretender* to our Crown, we must have *some disaffected Persons* amongst us; and such Men, by representing their Numbers to be much more considerable than they are, will always be endeavouring to stir up our Enemies to *invade* us; but this is a Danger which a *wise* and a *popular* Minister will always *despise*.—It is a Danger with which a *wicked* Minister will always endeavour to *frighten* us, and a *weak* one will really *frighten* himself.——When a *weak Minister* has, by his *Blunders*, raised a *general Discontent* and *Clamour* in the Nation, he must be sensible of that Discontent, he cannot but hear the general Murmur of a whole People; but as Men never ascribe a Misfortune to any Failing in themselves, if they can suppose another Cause for it, *such a Minister* will, in his own Imagination, convert that *general Discontent*, into a *general Disaffection* to the King then upon the Throne.—He will imagine, that the King, *like himself*, has *no friends* in the Nation, but *such as are paid* for being so; therefore when we hear a *Minister* and his *Favourites* making high Complaints against the *general Disaffection* that prevails among the People, we ought in *Duty* to the King, and in *Justice* to the *People*, to conclude, that the *Minister* is either a *wicked* or a *weak* Minister; and from such a one we can expect no Vigour in the Prosecution of a Foreign War.—The Power and Strength of the Nation will be exhausted in *providing* against an *Invasion*, instead of *applying* it towards making a vigo-

rous *Attack upon the Enemy*.—Such a Minister will always be like a true genuine *Polltroon*, who is so careful of his Carcass, and stands so much upon his Guard, that he never once thinks of making a *Push* at his Enemy, or does it in a Manner so faint, that it may be easily paried.

For this Reason, when I hear the *Terrors* of an *Invasion* made use of as an Argument for or against any Measures proposed, I am always apt to suspect it of *Wickedness* or *Weakness*; and, I think, I had never more Reason, than upon *this Occasion*.—It was impossible for *Spain* to invade us with a Squadron superior to that proposed to have been kept upon our own Coasts, or with an Army superior to that proposed to have been kept at Home; and however generally our People may be dissatisfied with the Measures of our Administration, 'tis well known, that, in no part of our Dominions, the Majority of the People can with the least Shadow of Justice be said to be *disaffected* to his Majesty. Therefore, suppose the *Spaniards* had privately embarked a few regular Forces, and those Forces had escaped our Squadrons at Sea, let them have landed where they would, we must suppose, that a much greater Number of our People would have joined our regular Troops against them, than would have joined with them; and as they could neither have returned to, nor received any Supplies from their own Country, they must certainly have been all cut to Pieces, or made Prisoners of War: This would certainly have been their Fate; and the Certainty of this Fate would have made it ridiculous for the Court of *Spain* to attempt any such Thing.

But it may be replied, that tho' *Spain* could not invade us, yet *France* might; and as we were not sure what Part *France* might take in the War, it was necessary to provide against an *Invasion* from *France* as well as *Spain*.

To this I answer, that *last Summer* the *French Navy* was in so bad Order, that it was impossible for them, in *six Months*, to provide a Squadron *superior* to that proposed to have been kept upon our own Coasts, and still more impossible for them to provide such a Number of Transports, as would have been necessary for transporting an Army *sufficient* to conquer this Kingdom, when so much *united*, as a *War* against *Spain*, *vigorously prosecuted*, would of Course have rendered *us*.—Nay, it would have been *last Summer* impossible for *France* and *Spain* joined together, to have fitted out such a Squadron as would have been *sufficient* to have protected their own Dominions, either in *Europe* or *America*.—If the *French* had *then* openly engaged, we might have ruined their Settlements in *America*, especially their *Sugar Islands*, before they could have sent thither any Squadron *sufficient* for their Protection; and it would have been extremely difficult for them to *repair* or *increase* their Navy, during an *open War* with us; because all Sorts of Naval Stores they must have *from other Countries*, and as all such are *contraband*, they might, and certainly would have been seized by us, tho' on board *neutral Ships*, upon its appearing that they were bound to any Port in *France* or *Spain*;—This would have rendered it impossible for them to get such a Quantity of *such Materials* as would have been *sufficient* for enabling them to *cope* with us at Sea.—This the Ministers of *France* were sensible of; therefore, we might have depended on it, that *France* would not have engaged in the War for *many Months* after its Commencement; and the Danger of their engaging *afterwards*, ought to have been a strong Motive for us, to make the best Use of our Time *at the Beginning*; in order to *force Spain* to a *Peace*, or to *establish ourselves* in the Possession of some of their best Settlements in *America*, before *France* had time to *prepare* for their *Assistance*.



As for the Danger we were in of an *Invasion* from *Sweden*, which some *ministerial Favourites* have been pleased to *frighten* us with, it was so chimerical, that it deserves no Answer; especially, when we consider, that we had, at a *most extraordinary* national Expence, secured *Denmark* in our Interest, and might without any Expence have secured *Muscovy*; for I am told, an Alliance was *last Spring* proposed by that powerful Empire, upon most advantageous Terms for us.——Why it was not accepted of, I cannot imagine; for we shall always be able to make *better Terms*, when our Alliance is *courted*, than when *we* are obliged to become *Suitors*.

Now with regard to the Objections that may be made to the *Prudence* of the Measures I have proposed.——First, It may be said, that the *Emperor*, the *French*, and the *Dutch*, are engag'd to guarantee to the present Royal Family of *Spain*, the *entire* Possession of all the Dominions yielded to them by Treaties; and that therefore, if we should attempt to take from them any of their Possessions in *America*, these three Powers would be obliged to join with *Spain* against us.

This Objection I should not have mentioned, if some of our Ministerial Writers had not already made use of it; for every one knows, that if any Nation, by attacking another, or by Violations and Breaches of solemn Treaties, brings a War upon it self, its Neighbours or Allies are of Course set free from every Guaranty, nay from every defensive Alliance they are engaged in with the offending Nation.——Their pretending to support or fulfil any Guaranty upon such an Occasion, would be a manifest Injustice to the Nation so attack'd or injured; and it is, I must say, surprising to hear this Objection made by *those very Men*, who, in the Year 1733, made use of *this very Excuse*, for our not performing



performing to the *Emperor* that Guaranty which we had engaged in but in the Year 1731.—Whether this Excuse was *then* well founded, I shall not now pretend to determine; but, 'tis certain, that our making use of it *at that Time*, quite altered that System of Affairs in *Europe*, which we *ourselves* had a great Hand in establishing; and, I believe, I may go so far as to say, that this Excuse was not upon *that Occasion* so well founded, as such an Excuse would now be, if it should be made use of by the *Emperor*, *France* and *Holland*, for not assisting *Spain* in the *present War* with us.—We have been most *notoriously* injured by *Spain*.—We have shewn the most *unparallel'd* Patience and Forbearance.—We have made many *repeated*, and, I hope, *earnest* Applications for Reparation.—We even at last agreed to accept of the *most trifling* Reparation that was ever accepted of by an injured Nation; and after that Reparation was denied, notwithstanding its having been solemnly and expressly promised, surely no Nation in *Europe* can pretend to stand obliged by any Guaranty, to assist *Spain* against us; or to prevent our taking such Methods as we shall think fit, for revenging ourselves upon a Nation that has so grossly abused and affronted us.

Such an Objection therefore there cannot be the least Ground for; but then in the second Place, it may be objected against the *Prudence* of what I have proposed, that tho' neither the *Emperor* nor *Holland* may think themselves obliged by any Treaty, nor concerned in *Interest*, to assist *Spain* against us, yet, if we should pretend to make a Conquest of any of the *Spanish* Settlements in *America*, the *French* would think themselves obliged *in Interest*, if not by Treaty, to endeavour to prevent it, by joining with *Spain* against us, which would render the War extremely dangerous and vastly expensive: Whereas, if we prosecute the War, only by seizing all the *Spanish* Ships we can meet with at Sea, and by preventing  
any

any Correspondence between the *Spanish* Dominions in *Europe* and those in *America*, the *French* will not think themselves obliged in *Interest* to engage in the War; and by this Means we may in a few Years bring the *Spanish* Affairs into such Distress both in *Europe* and *America*, as must at last force them to accept of Peace upon reasonable Terms, without running ourselves into any Danger, or being at any very extraordinary Expence.

In order to answer this Objection, I must lay it down as a Maxim, that it is very much our Interest to put a *speedy* as well as an *honourable* End to the War; and after having laid this down as a Maxim, I shall examine, whether it be possible to put either a *speedy* or an *honourable* End to the War, by the Methods proposed in this Objection.—As to that of prosecuting the War, by seizing and making Prize of such of the *Spanish* Ships as we may meet with at Sea, which I shall beg Leave to call a *Pyrrhical War*, I do not think we can propose to gain great Advantage: Nay, upon the Balance we may perhaps find ourselves Losers.—We would certainly be very great Losers, if we should hereafter take no better Care of our Trade, than we have done hitherto.—The *Spaniards* would carry on no Trade in their own Bottoms.—We must; and in Spite of all the Precautions we could take, their Privateers would be every now and then snapping up some of our Merchant Ships, they found sailing without Convoy, or separated, perhaps by a Storm, from the Convoy appointed them. Therefore, I must conclude, that if we take no other Method for prosecuting the War, it may last for these twenty Years; during all which Time, we must keep a strong Squadron in the *Mediterranean*, another in the *West Indies*, and a third at Home, together with a numerous Standing Army to guard us against that terrible Thing called an *Invasion*.

Now let us see, whether we could force them to  
a Com-

a Compliance by the other Method proposed, which is that of preventing any Correspondence being carried on, between their Dominions in *Europe* and those in *America*. This I shall grant we may, by proper Measures, pretty effectually prevent; at least we could prevent the carrying on of such a Correspondence in any *Spanish* Bottoms, or in any Ships that appeared to belong to the *Spaniards*; but then I must observe, that if we succeed in this, we render the other Method entirely ineffectual: A *Pyrrhical* War, where there is nothing to take, would signify nothing: It would be *all Loss* and *no Gain* to us; so that if we take this Method of preventing any *Spanish* Ships passing or repassing from *Spain* to *America* we must trust to it alone, for putting an End to the War. And I must farther observe, that the *most effectual* Way for preventing this Correspondence, is by stationing our Men of War and Privateers properly in the *American* Seas: It can never be done *so effectually* in the Seas of *Europe*; and we know how destructive it is, both for our Ships and Seamen, to keep them hovering constantly upon the *Spanish* Coasts of *America*.——However, suppose we put ourselves to this Expence, and that it effectually answered the End intended, what should hinder the *Spaniards* from opening a Trade between *Old Spain* and their Settlements in *America*, to all the Nations in *Europe* except this? We could not pretend to seize *Neutral* Ships, nor to take any Thing but *contraband* Goods out of them, which neither *Gold* nor *Silver* is; and all the *Gold* and *Silver*, and other Effects, on board these Ships would be loaded by foreign Factors residing in the *Spanish West Indies*, and consigned to foreign Factors residing in *Spain*.——'Tis true, we wisely obtained by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, for I hope I may say, there were *some* wise Things done by that Treaty, notwithstanding its being now *so much the Fashion* to rail at it; I say, we wisely obtained by that Treaty a Stipulation from

the *French*, that they should not obtain or accept of any other Usage of Navigation and Trade to Spain, and the Spanish Indies, than what was practised there in the Reign of the late King Charles II. of Spain; but we have no such Stipulation with any other Nation in Europe, and I doubt much if any one of them would be so complaisant to us, as to refuse to be Carriers for the Spaniards. — Even the *French* would in such a Case pretend, they were free from the Stipulation I have mentioned; because in the above-mentioned Article there are these Words, *or than what shall likewise be fully given and granted at the same Time to other Nations and People, concerned in Trade.* And since we now appear so much afraid of the *French* joining in the War against us, I question much if we would then venture to provoke their doing so, by compelling a strict Observance of that Stipulation. — Thus it must appear, that the War may in this Shape, and by this Method of Prosecution, be as lasting as in the other; and it will of course be more expensive and less advantageous to us.

I shall most readily grant, that by prosecuting the War according to either of these Methods, we are in no Danger of having the *French* engage against us; because it is *their Interest* not only to engage us in such a War, but to make it as lasting as possible. — During such a War, they will have a great Advantage over us in Trade, in every Part of the World except the *Baltick*; for our Merchant Ships can sail no where else without Convoy; and the waiting for Convoy is always expensive to the Merchant, and sometimes makes his Ship come too late to the Market. — This will enable the *French* to undersell us, and thereby worm us out of our Trade, in *Portugal, Italy, and Turkey*; and during the Prohibition of our Manufactures, they will have an Opportunity of establishing the Use of *theirs* in all the Spanish Dominions both in Europe and America: Nay, as I have said, they may perhaps get into an open



open Trade with the *latter*; and they would, besides, gain many other Advantages by the Prolongation of the War between this Nation and *Spain*, which I have not room to mention.

Therefore as it is the *Business* of the *French* to have the War we are now engaged in *prolonged*, it is *our Business* to bring it to *as speedy* a Conclusion as possible; and the only Way of doing this, is by making Conquests upon the *Spaniards* in *America*.

—— This is not only the proper Method for bringing the War to a *speedy* Conclusion, but it is the *only* Method by which we can obtain a *sufficient* Recompence for the Damage and Expence we have already sustained, or may hereafter sustain.——

We cannot expect, that all the *Piracies* we can make upon the *Spaniards* at Sea will atone for the Losses we may suffer, and the Expence we must be at; and we can less expect, that, at the End of a heavy and tedious War, the King of *Spain* will be able to pay us a Sum of Money equal to our Losses and Expence, even if we should at last force him to promise it by Treaty.—— Whereas there are several Conquests we may make in the *West Indies*, that would be a sufficient Atonement to the Nation; and a successful Attack upon the *Spaniards*, in that Part of the World, would certainly produce an immediate Peace, because they would thereby be compelled to agree to any Terms we pleased to propose.

From what I have said, I think, 'tis plain, that it was ridiculous in us to declare War against *Spain*, or to think of righting ourselves *by force of Arms*, without resolving to begin *with pushing* the War in the most effectual Manner, by an Attack upon some of their Settlements in the *West Indies*, and that without the least Regard to what *France* might in such a Case resolve to do.—— I shall grant it would be both dangerous and expensive for us, to stand single and alone in a War against *France* and



*Spain.*——What then?——Could we in Honour avoid engaging in the War?——Must we lye down and die for Fear, because we think we are overmatched?——Would such a Conduct look like the Spirit of the *English Nation*?——The *Manes* of our Ancestors, who came off Victors from the glorious Fields of *Agincourt*, *Poitiers*, and *Winnendale*, notwithstanding the vast *Inequality* of Numbers, would rise up in Judgment against us.——*Therefore with them, let us resolve to cut our Way with our Swords, through the Multitude of Foes that surround us, or die gloriously in the Attempt.*

But here, I know, the Danger of an *Invasion* from *France*, with the *Pretender* at its Head, will be repeated upon me, and represented in the most *bideous Light*.——Tho' I have already answered this Objection, yet give me Leave to observe, that this *Bug-bear* could never be made use of with less Weight than in the *present War*.——It is the most *genuine English War* that this Nation has been engaged in, ever since the Days of *Queen Elizabeth*.——It has united the Hearts of the *whole Nation* in Affection and Duty to his Majesty; and if the Conduct of it had been put into the Hands of a *popular Administration*, it would have united the Hands and the Purfes of the People in a *vigorous Prosecution*, and in repelling every *Invasion*, every *Attack*, that could give the least *Interruption* to that *Prosecution*.——Let us but give Satisfaction to our People, *with regard to their Liberties*, and take Care to *arm and discipline the Militia*, single and alone we shall have no occasion to fear the *united Power* of *France* and *Spain*:——We shall then stand in no need of a *numerous Standing Army* for keeping out the *Pretender*, and much less of *foreign Auxiliaries*.

As for the latter, I hope I shall never see any more of them brought into this Kingdom, for that or any other Purpose.——It is difficult,—It is almost impossible

impossible to prevent their *mistaking* a Friend for a Foe, where a *little Booty* is to be got ; and therefore in all our Civil Dissentions, even when actual Rebellion breaks out, our Government ought to trust its Defense to *its own People*.—*New Regiments* ought to be raised, or any Method taken, rather than call in *foreign Troops*.—It is ridiculous, as well as dangerous, to call *foreign Troops* to our Aid, whilst a great many of our *old brave Officers* are *starving* upon *Half-pay* ; and Multitudes of *young Gentlemen languishing* under the *low Character* and *scanty Subsistence* of *Subaltern Officers* in our Army.—By raising *new Regiments*, instead of calling in *foreign Troops*, the former would be *provided for* and the latter *advanced*.—a violent Spirit of *Disaffection* rendered it excusable in the late Reign ; but tho' then practised for the *Support* of the *Royal Family* against a *disaffected Party*, I hope I shall never see it practised for the *Support* of a *Minister* against the *Discontents* of the *whole People*.—This the *Gentlemen of the Army* should themselves consider of ; for if ever *foreign Troops* should be called in to *support* a *Minister* against an *Insurrection* of the *People*, they may be probably kept here to *secure* the same *Minister* against a *Mutiny* in the *Army*.

For this Reason I cannot altogether approve of the Terms of our *late Treaty* with *Denmark*.—It was certainly right to engage that Crown in our Interest ; but since we were to pay *so well* for it, I think we should have stipulated such a Number of *Troops*, or such a Number of *Ships of War*, according as we might have Occasion.—We can have no occasion for the *Troops*, under the *Condition upon which they are stipulated*, unless we form an Army upon the Continent of *Europe* ; and That we cannot pretend to, without the *Conjunction* of *several other Powers*, besides that of *Denmark*, which we *then* had, I am afraid we *still* have but very little Hopes of.——  
If we should have no *Power* to deal with but *Spain*,

we can have no occasion for the *Danish Troops*, and if we should be obliged to stand *alone* against *France* and *Spain*, they can be of little or no Use to us, *because of the Condition upon which they are stipulated*; for I hope I shall never see *Danish Troops* called into *this Island*, in order to replace any Number of our own Troops, we may be obliged to fend out.—It would be better for us to raise 10000 new *National Troops*, than submit to the Danger of calling in *half* that Number of *foreign*.—Our *Liberties* may be in Danger by a numerous Standing Army of *our own Troops*, but they are certainly much more in Danger, when the *Obedience* of *our own Troops* to the *arbitrary* Commands of an ambitious Prince or wicked Prime Minister, is *secured by a large Body of foreign Mercenaries*, who have no Friends or Relations in the Country to take Care of, nor any *Motives* for *refusing* to *obey* the most arbitrary, the most illegal, the most cruel Commands.—Therefore, besides the Injury that is done to the *Officers of our own Troops*, by preventing their Advancement in the Army, besides the *Affront* that is put upon *our own Armies*, by shewing a *Diffidence* either in their *Honour* or their *Courage*, the calling in of *foreign Troops* must always be of the most dangerous Consequence to our *Liberties*.—For this Reason, it ought never to be allowed of, but in a Case of the most absolute Necessity; and even then, not without the Consent of Parliament.—It ought to be made High-Treason for any Subject of *Britain*, to *advise* calling them in, or *assist* in bringing them over, without *such previous* Consent; for if they should be called in with a View to *oppress* our *Liberties*, and once safely landed, it would be easy to obtain the *Approbation* of Parliament, because few would venture to declare their *Disapprobation*.

But now to return to my Subject; suppose we had been certain, that *France* would have declared against

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us at the very Commencement of this War, unless we submitted to *prosecute* it according to *their Directions*; and suppose we had no Hopes of being able to stand alone against the united Power of *France* and *Spain*; was this Nation so sunk in its Character at *foreign Courts*, or was the Power of the *House of Bourbon*, by our *Fondness for Negotiation*, become so terrible, that we could upon no Terms prevail with the other Powers of *Europe* to form a Confederacy against it?—Surely it was not the Interest of any one of the other Powers of *Europe* to allow the *House of Bourbon* to add *Great Britain* to its other extensive Dominions, or to make our Sovereign a sort of *Vice-King* under his *Most Christian Majesty*; and if it was not their Interest, what could prevail with them, so far to neglect themselves as to neglect us?—This could not proceed from any Disregard to a Nation from which some of them had, in former Times, received such substantial Marks of Friendship, nor could it proceed from any want of Confidence in our Power, since they had from Experience so good Reason to trust to it.—It could proceed from nothing but a want of Confidence in our Conduct, and this obliges me to mention another Measure which with Regret I mention, and yet I am obliged to say, that I think we ought to have taken it, as soon as we saw that a War was become inevitable: It is a Measure which I must think was absolutely necessary for securing the Success of the War in which we were about to engage: I mean a Change in our Administration, or at least the removing of some Persons that had at that Time an Influence in our Councils.—This does not proceed from any personal Dislike or Disrespect to any Man that now is, or has lately been concerned in the Administration.—I have no Motives of a private Nature to desire such a Change.—I never shall, I hope, allow myself to be governed by such.—It proceeds intirely from the Regard I have to the Safety and Honour of my Country.



Country.—A War with *Spain alone*, we knew, could be no way dangerous to *this Nation*.—The *only* Danger we were in was that of *France's* joining with *Spain* against us; and the *only proper* Method for preventing this, was that of forming an Alliance with the *most powerful* States upon the *Continent*, which could not be done without bringing the *Emperor of Germany* into the Alliance.—Therefore, if there was *any Man* in our Councils, who, by his former Conduct, had given *Cause of Jealousy or Distaste* to the *Court of Vienna*; he ought to have been removed; for could we expect that the *Court of Vienna* would *cordially* enter into a Negotiation, and much less into an Alliance against such a *formidable* Power as that of *France* and *Spain*, whilst our Councils were any Way influenced by those, *whose Engagements or Conduct, they thought, they could put no Confidence in?*

I shall not enter upon the invidious, perhaps dangerous, Task, of shewing that there are some amongst us, who, *from their past Conduct*, can expect no Favours, no Confidence, from the *Court of Vienna*, or indeed, from any Court in Europe, *except those of France and Spain*.—Let us consider our Conduct for these *fifteen Years* past, and then let every Man *lay his Hand upon his Heart*, and *declare upon his Conscience*, whether he does not think, there are *some such Men* amongst us?—If there are, I am sure, in the present Juncture of Affairs, they ought not to be admitted into any of his Majesty's Councils.—Our *Gazettes* and *News Papers* may tickle our Hopes, and amuse us, with the *warlike Preparations* of the *Dutch*.—The *Dutch* may, *they ought*, at such a Crisis, to increase their Forces both by Sea and Land; but if *France* should declare against us, it is almost impossible for them to declare in our Favour, unless we could procure them an *Alliance upon the Continent* sufficient to protect them *at Land*, which, I'm afraid, cannot be done, unless we recover that Friendship  
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and Confidence at the Court of *Vienna*, which we ought to cultivate, *even at any Expence*, as long as there remains such an *Unity* between *France* and *Spain*.—Nay, even with Respect to the *Dutch* themselves, whatever outward Appearances may be kept up, I'm afraid, some of the *leading Men* of that State entertain a Sort of Jealousy of our Conduct: In some of our late Measures relating to them, *we ought to have gone farther, or we ought not to have gone so far*.—And with Regard to *Prussia*, every one knows, that we have had no very good Intelligence with that Court, ever since we disappointed his *Prussian Majesty* with Regard to the Affair of *Thorn*, which Affair was his principal Motive for joining with us in the Treaty of *Hanover*.

These were the *three Powers of Europe* whose Alliance we ought, upon the present Occasion, to have courted with the *most Ardor*; and if there were any amongst us who, by *their past Conduct*, had given all or any of these Powers a Disgust, such Persons ought to have been removed from having any Hand, for the future, in the Direction of our Affairs.——Therefore, if we are obliged to prosecute the War against *Spain*, according to *French Directions*, and by so doing to make it last, till our *own Trade* be ruined and the *Trade of France* established; if we should be obliged to allow *France*, behind the Curtain, to make such a Peace for us, as she has lately made for the *Emperor*; or if we should sink under the Burthen of standing *single and alone* against the *united Power of France and Spain*; I shall impute the Misfortune to our not having removed from our Councils (if there are any such) those who, by their Conduct, had given our *ancient and most natural Allies* such a Diffidence or Distaste, as to make them neglect their *own Interest*, rather than join in an Alliance with us.

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From hence it must appear, that if there was any Weight in the Objection made against the *Prudence* of our Beginning the War by an Attack upon the *Spaniards* in *America*, it proceeded wholly from our not having put our Affairs under a new Direction as soon as we found that a War was become *inevitable*.—If we had done this, I am convinced, we should have been, *before this Time*, in Possession of some of the *chief Spanish* Settlements in *America*, and that they would not have been in Possession of *near the Number* of *British* Merchant Ships.—It is really amazing, that in *nine Months Time* we should not have made the least Step towards doing any Thing that could be *effectual* for *speedily* compelling the *Spaniards* to submit to reasonable Terms.—It is amazing that in *six or seven Months Time*, they should have been able to take at Sea 50 or 60 *British Merchant Ships*, besides those they seized in their Ports.—It is amazing, that in *so long a Time*, we could not lay hold of so much as one of those Privateers that have done us so much Damage.—But above all, it is amazing, that *to this Day*, we have not, so far as I can hear, *one Man of War*, large or small, cruising off of the Port of *St. Sebastian*, notwithstanding the *many Privateers* that have been fitted out at *that Port*, and the *great Number* of *English* Merchant Ships that have been taken by them.—This is a bad Omen of our future Conduct; and can be no Encouragement to our *ancient Allies*, to join with us in any *new Alliance*.—And it is the more inexcusable, because we cannot now propose to set out upon any Expedition against the *Spaniards* in *America*, *before the Month of August or September next*.—By that Time the *French* will have had *above a Year* to repair and increase their Navy *without Interruption*; and therefore, if they then find us without a *powerful Alliance* upon the Continent, they may probably, nay, I believe they will certainly, resolve to engage in the War, rather than

than allow us to make ourselves Masters of any of the Spanish Settlements in America.

Therefore, if a strong foreign Alliance was necessary at the Beginning of this War, it is now become more necessary; and for this Reason, if a Change of Pilots was necessary at the Beginning of the War, it is now more necessary than it was at first. —

We have already neglected, — irrecoverably, I'm afraid, neglected that Opportunity which alone could have enabled us to stand single and alone against the united Power of France and Spain. — If we had got Possession of some of the chief Spanish Settlements in America, before the French could have come to their Assistance, we might have carried on the War for several Years against both with Success, we might have concluded it with Honour; but if the French, after a twelve Month's uninterrupted Preparation, should join the Spaniard, before we have, in the least, diminished the Power of the latter, I fear, that, without a powerful Assistance from our Neighbours upon the Continent, neither the Progress nor the Event of the War will contribute much, either to our Advantage or Reputation; especially, if the Conduct of it be left to those, who neglected so fair an Opportunity as we had last Summer, of forcing the Spaniards to an immediate Peace, or of putting ourselves in a Condition to carry on the War at their Expence.

This may shew us our present Danger. — This may shew us how to avoid it. — But now after having declared so expressly for a Change in the Administration, I must expect that the Advocates, who have shewn so much Wit, and so much Strength of Reason, in Vindication of every one of our late Measures both at Home and Abroad, from the Hanover Treaty to the late Convention with Spain, and from the Excise Scheme, to our late Contest about retaining Placemen and private Pensioners in the House of Commons; I

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say I must expect, that these *steady* Advocates for *unsteady* Measures will pour forth a Deluge of their Wit upon me.——I expect to be told, that I have been simple enough to take off the Mask, and declare openly for *that* which is the *only* Thing the *whole* Patriot Party aim at.——But I must desire these Gentlemen to consider, if their Joy at finding such a Fund for Wit and Humour will give them Leave, that, upon the Supposition I have made, which I leave to every candid Reader to judge of, I have given a *most substantial* Reason, why every Man that *wishes well* to his Country should *now wish* for *such a Change*.——And to this I shall, without Scruple, add, that tho' our late Conduct, or present Circumstances, had given no Occasion for such a Change, the Nature of our Constitution requires it.——Our Ministers, from the *highest* to the *lowest*, ought be *accountable* to the *People*, as well as to their *Sovereign*, for their Conduct; but a Minister, by being continued *too long* in Power, may form such a Party in the Kingdom, and take such Measures, as may make it dangerous for *both joined together* to call him to an Account; and he may easily, *considering the Power now lodged in the Crown*, make it absolutely impossible for the *People* to call him to an Account, so long as he enjoys the Ear of his *Sovereign*; which will of Course encourage him to oppress and plunder the People, and to convert the *whole Wealth* of the Nation to the *enriching* of himself, and such as shall shew themselves to be his obedient and submissive Slaves.——It is therefore extremely proper, *both for King and People*, that every Minister should think himself liable to answer, *even in this Life*, as a *private Man*, for what he has done as a *Publick*.——It is extremely dangerous to give any Minister room to suppose, that he is in for Life, only because he reckons the King's Life a better Life than his own; for when a Minister begins to imagine, he cannot,



in this Life, be made to account for his Actions, it is great odds but he becomes a most *unaccountable Minister*.

From what I have said it is, I think, evident, that a *Change in our Administration* is a Measure which is not only agreeable to our Constitution, but in the Case I have supposed absolutely necessary in our present Circumstances.——We are in Danger of being obliged to conclude this War by a *dishonourable and destructive Peace*, or of being obliged, by *French Menaces*, to carry it on in the *most tedious* and the *most ruinous Manner*.——This Danger I have shewn to be *now* greater than it was at the *Beginning* of the War.——We have no Way of avoiding this Danger but by a vigorous Prosecution of the War, in the *most effectual Manner*, against Spain, and securing ourselves against the *forcible* Interposition of France, by a *powerful Alliance* upon the Continent.——Can we expect a *vigorous* Prosecution from *those* who, by their *Puillanimity*, have involved us in the War? —— Can we expect, that *those* who, by their Conduct, have rendered us *Allyless*, should procure us an *effectual Alliance*? ——Without a *Change of Men* we cannot well expect a *Change of Measures*; and therefore, I dread our being amused with *Expedient after Expedient*, till our *Destruction* becomes at last *unavoidable*.——During last Session of Parliament, we were diverted with a *preliminary Convention*.——During *this*, we have been diverted with *Preparations* against, and a *few Piracies* committed upon the Enemy.——And during *next*, we may be diverted with an *expensive Expedition* to the *West-Indies*; but without such a Change as I have mentioned, I shall, from thence expect no Success: At least I shall expect, that the Success will be prevented by a *Suspension of Arms* and a *Congress*; and with that *Congress* we may perhaps be diverted as long as we have already been with *Negotiation*.——Imbarkations we may have,



Encampments we shall probably have, for the Diversion of our Ladies, and the Entertainment of those Officers and Soldiers, who delight more in *Feats of Gallantry*, than in *Feats of Arms*; but if we be governed by *French* Counsels, I shall expect to hear of no *Battles*, much less of any *Triumphs*; and I must particularly recommend it to the Consideration of the *young Gentlemen* of our Army, whether it would not be more honourable, more advantageous, and, I am sure, more desirable to *most of them*, to be *gaining* Riches, Renown, and Preference, or an honourable Death, in an *Enemy's Country*, than to be *loitering* away the Flower of their Age in a voluptuous and inglorious Camp, either in *Hyde-Park*, or upon *Hounslow* or *Black Heath*.

The appointing of those who are to be the Nation's chief Counsellors and Conductors, I shall most readily allow to be a Prerogative inherent in the Crown alone; but in this, as in every other Branch of the Prerogative, *the Parliament may interpose by its Advice*; and his present Majesty has always shewn such a Regard to the *Advice of his Parliament*, and to the *Happiness* and *Security* of his *People*, that he certainly will comply with what may appear to be the Desire of *his Parliament*.——If our King were an *absolute* Monarch, or if we had not now subsisting a Parliament that, I hope, will be allowed to be perfectly *free and independent*, I should not have taken the Trouble of communicating to the Publick my Thoughts, either of our *past Conduct* or *present Danger*; not because of any *personal Risk* I might run, but because I could not expect to do *any Service* to *my Country*; for when I think I can do *a Service* to *my Country*, I shall always *despise* the *Danger* I may *thereby* expose myself to, let it proceed from what Quarter it will.——But as our *Monarchy* is *limited*, as our *Parliament* not only has a Right, but *dare* give a *free and sincere* Advice to their Sovereign, without Regard to the *most favourite* Minister, I hope they

they will, *before the End of this Session*, take the present dangerous Situation of their Country into their most serious Consideration.——If any Thing I have said can contribute in the least towards making them resolve to do so, I shall think I have done *my Country a real Service*; because I am convinced they will *then* give their Sovereign that Advice which, in their great Wisdom, they may think best, for eschewing the Danger we are now exposed to.

Our Contest *now*, is not about who shall be in, or who shall be out:——It is *now* about the Salvation of our Country; and I hope no Man will think, that the Gratitude he may owe to Ministers, should, upon any Occasion, prevail with him to make a Sacrifice of his Country.——If those that are now in have, by cultivating *too long* and *too close* a Correspondence with *France*, rendered themselves obnoxious to our *ancient* and *most natural Allies*, they must be out, or *their Country* may run the Risk of being *sacrificed* to their *Continuance* in Power.——If this be the Case, they can no longer hold it, but by the *Friendship of France* and the *enslaving of their Country*.——In such a *Dilemma*, if they are sensible of their being brought into any such, and have the least Regard for their Country, they will *voluntarily* resign their Power, rather than hold it by such a dishonourable Tenure.——If they should not in such a Case do it *voluntarily* and *freely*, our Parliament may interpose, and by that Means they ought to be made to yield to those who may be *more acceptable* to the foreign Powers whose Friendship *we now* stand so much in Need of.—But suppose there were no *foreign Cause* for a *Change*, surely the People have *more Reason* to place a Confidence in those who desire to render it almost impossible for any Minister to *screen* his Conduct from a legal, a strict, and an impartial *Inquiry*, than in those who insist upon it as a Part of our Constitution, that the Conduct of no Minister shall

shall or can be *fairly inquired* into, so long as he has the Cunning and good Luck to preserve the Favour of his Prince; which I am sure will be the Case, if it should ever be in the Power of a Minister, to have a Majority of Place-men and Pensioners in the House of Commons.—And I will aver, that during a dangerous foreign War, it is *absolutely necessary* to have the Administration in the Hands of those, in whom the People are *most likely* to place an entire Confidence.—Under a *bated* or *despised* Administration, we can expect *no Conduct* in our Officers, we can expect *no Spirit* or *Courage* in our Sailors or Soldiers: Every Campaign may make a *Sacrifice* of a General, as happened in the Emperor's late War against the Turks; but a few unfortunate Campaigns will at last make a *Sacrifice* of our Country.—To which I must add, and with this I shall conclude, that it would highly contribute to the Establishment of our Credit at *foreign Courts*, to the Satisfaction of our People at Home, and to the Weight of every Resolution we may take, were it publicly known, that the *Heir apparent* to our Crown assisted at all our Councils, and that he was one of the *chief Advisers* and *Promoters* of all the Treaties we conclude, and of all the publick Measures we resolve to pursue; for it would be a Satisfaction to our People to see the Prince learning the Art of Government before he came to have Occasion to practise it; and it would be an Assurance to our Neighbours, that his *Royal Highness's* Accession to our Crown would produce no Alteration in our Measures; so that our Enemies could from thence entertain no Hopes, nor our Allies any Fears.

F I N I S.

